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The Legal Position of Framework Decisions 
 
 
Abstract. The framework decisions, as the central legal act under the “third pillar” are some of 
the most significant non-typical documents from a dogmatic point of view within the EU law. 
The differences and specialities of this legislative act, correlated with the EC Treaty are 
available not only in the lawmaking process, but in juridical supervision as well. The main goal 
of this paper is to show the dogmatic and practical aspects of these two perspectives. First of 
all it is necessary to predict, why the framework decisions are not products of classic public 
international law (according to the position of the German Federal Constitutional Court), rather 
than special documents, and do they consequently belong to a supranational system. The 
missing infringement procedure within the police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
makes the judicial control of the Member State’s effective enlargement extremely difficult. 
Secondly it is important to demonstrate the alternative methods of the ECJ, which is based on 
case law from the Court of Luxembourg, in the field of the directives. In this context the study 
will analyze the consequences of the important “Pupino” Judgment. 
 





The free movement of persons, and the fall of the physical borders within the 
EU caused a harmonization needs in the field of the judicial cooperation.1 In 
the matter of these the position of the criminal matter has been converted, from 
a field as a part of the Member State’s sovereignty to a flexible cooperation 
based on a common interest.2 
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 1 Huseman, R. C.: Die Beeinflussung des deutschen Wirtschaftsrechts durch Rahmenbe-
schlüsse der Europäischen Union. Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht (2004) 454. 
 2 von Bubnoff, E.: Legislative Gestaltung des europäischen Rechtsraums und deren 
Umsetzung in den Mitgliedstaaten. In: Pache, E. (ed.): Die Europäische Union – Ein Raum 
der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts? Baden-Baden, 2005. 105. 
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 The political heart of this idea was based on the institutional revision 
involving the Maastricht Treaty. The variations were leading to leave the single 
economic perspective of the integration, and to expand it with other policies. 
This expansion resulted the establishing of the so called “third pillar”, nowa-
days with the official term police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.  
 The main goal of this area of EU law is to create a team work within criminal 
policy, which is able to guarantee the highest level of safety for peoples within 
the EU. The rules concerning the third pillar were created not within the usual 
contractual frameworks of the EC, but in the in 1992 newly launched EU 
Treaty. But the Member States separated with the Treaty-revision of Amsterdam 
the identity of the regulation and it was putting every judicial cooperation 
concerning the visa, the asylum, the immigration and the public matters in the 
deeply integrated EC Treaty.  
 The reasonable proof according this paper that the framework decisions left 
the category of the rule made by the classic international public law, but arose 
to the level of a supranational system, and it made the ultimate valuation of the 
framework decisions very difficult and controversial.3 The obvious contrasts 
and specialities of this legislative act, correlated with the EC Treaty are available 
not only in the lawmaking process, but in the juridical supervision as well. The 
main goal of this paper is to remarkably present the dogmatic and functional 
aspects of these two attitudes, and to prove an enthusiastic proper place for the 







The EU Treaty doesn’t create a new institutional framework for the new policies 
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. The EU Treaty “shall be founded on the 
European Communities”, which has been “supplemented” by the Member States.4 
For this purpose there wasn’t any need for establishing a new institutional 
body. The EU Treaty tried to strive towards an uniform legal system.5 That’s 
why the well known institutions are the key players in the Provisions on Police 
and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, as well. 
  
 3 Kraus-Vonjar, M.: Der Aufbau eines Raums der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des 
Rechts in Europa. Frankfurt a. M., 2002. 7. 
 4 Article 1 sec 3 TEU. 
 5 Article 3 sec 1 TEU. 
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 The legislation procedure contains previously in its first step an attribute, 
which is rather an additional attribute for the public international law. The 
Commission’s initiative monopoly, well known from the first pillar,6 is impaired. 
Beside the Commission the member states won the right to purpose a subject 
for a framework decision.7 Before the reconciliation within the European Council 
a discussion is taking place in the supporting bodies under the Council, which 
consisted of officials delegated by the Member States.8 After it a coordination 
panel9 deals with the draft to clear legal questions elaborated by the supporting 
bodies under the Council.  
 It is a legitimate question, how the role of the European Parliament looks 
like. The maximum contribution of the European Parliament is limited under 
the legislation procedure to the consultation.10 It is statutory for the Member 
States to carry out the consultation procedure, otherwise the ECJ void the 
framework decision due to a formal injury. 11 However to follow the relevant 
opinion of the European Parliament is absolutely not binding for the Council. 
This weak role of the European Parliament shows the problem of the democracy 
deficit within the third pillar.  
 The Council makes the final decision about the framework decision with 
acting unanimously.12 The sensitive character of the regulation field and the 
criminal sovereignty of states purposely avoided establishing a qualified majority 
decision within the third pillar. To acting unanimously needs a higher level 
of cooperation from the part of the Member States. The Members of the 
Commission are entitled only to be present at the debate.13 This clearly reflects 
that the main decision power is in the hand of the Member States.14 
 
  
  6 Article 251 TEC. 
  7 Article 34 sec 2 TEU. 
  8 Huseman: op. cit. 448. 
  9 Article 41 sec 1 TEU. 
 10 Article 39 sec 1 TEU. 
 11 Case 138/79 Roquette Frères [1980] European Court Reports 3333, para. 33. 
 12 Article 34 sec 2 TEU. 
 13 Article 36 sec 2 TEU. 
 14 Müller-Graf, P.–C.: Europäische Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Justiz und 
Inneres. In: Müller-Graf, P.–C. (ed.): Europäische Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Justiz 
und Inneres. Baden-Baden, 1996. 32. 
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The distinguishing nature of the Member State’s obligation generated by the 
framework decision 
 
The result of the legislation procedure is the framework decision, which causes 
a real obligation for the Member States. According the Treaty “the framework 
decisions shall be binding upon the Member States as to the result to be achieved 
but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and method”. It 
means, Member States can choose free the tools from the constitutional 
instruments, which are suitable for an effective implementation, but the imple-
mentation itself is obligatory. To achieve an effective implementation, the 
Member States should concentrate to the central task set up by the framework 
decision. Therefore the freedom of the Member States is limited to the “effet 
utile” of the judicial rule. This result focused mentality of the ECJ means not 
only a positive legislative action from the part of the Member States, but a 
negative as well. A negative action basically causes in this context on the one 
hand the avoidance of recent legislation actions being not coherent with the 
main task of the framework decisions, and on the other hand annulment of former 





After representing the specialities of the legislative procedure the study deals 
with the modified juridical control within the third pillar. With the Treaty of 
Amsterdam won the ECJ a stronger competence within the third pillar, but in a 
comparison with the Community law it is still poor. The competence of the 
ECJ is defined by Article 46 EU. However this Article doesn’t create the real 
competence, just points out Article 35 EU. Thereby the ECJ’s jurisdiction in 




The rules about the preliminary decision contain specialities compared with 
the procedures described in 234 EC. The formal divergence is recognizable 
in the double competence ruling. Firstly, the Member States can declare the 
competence of the ECJ concerning this particular procedure at all.15 If the 
competence is given, secondly the Member States can decide which Courts can 
take part in the procedure. There are two alternatives. The Member States can 
  
 15 Article 35 sec 2 TEU. 
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actively enable to any courts or tribunals, or just for those, whose decisions 
there is no judicial remedy under national law, to request the Court of Justice 
to give a preliminary ruling on a question rose in a case pending before it.16 To 
make any restriction involving the subject of questions is not possible.17 It is 
also not possible to recall the declaration made by the Member States.18  
 The interpretation of the Articles describing this special juridical procedure 
by the ECJ is an interesting academic question. The Treaty allowed just the 
interpretation of legal documents based on these articles of the Treaty, but 
there isn’t any relevant information about the interpretation of this section of 
the Treaty itself.19 The Court answered this question positively.20 
 
The legality procedure 
 
The legality procedure has also specific items. The number of the applicants is 
limited to the Commission and to the Member States. In this context it is missing, 
by contrast to the Community law, the right to apply for individuals and for the 
European Parliament. According to the language of the Treaty the framework 
decisions have no direct effect to individuals, so that’s why they have also 
no right to complain directly against it. The underprivileged position of the 
European Parliament was already mentioned. The missing right to apply for 
individuals and for the Member States is a political symbol, which is characteristic 
for the inter-governmental cooperation, and not for a supranational system.  
 If during the legislation procedure the Parliament is not been consulted, 
cause a typical formal procedure failure.21 An example for an important 
substance item is the correct legal basis. If the judicial review shows the 
Community act has an incorrect legal basis the ECJ will repeal the measure.22 
In this context it is relevant, to which pillar a legal act belongs passed by the 
EU, to the first or to the third?23  
 
  
 16 Article 36 sec 3 TEU. 
 17 Röben, V.: in Grabitz/Hilf Article 35 Rn. 10. 
 18 Brechmann, W.: in Calliess/Ruffert Article 35 EUV Rn. 4. 
 19 Borchardt, K-D.: in Lenz/Borchardt Article 36 Rn. 4. 
 20 Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] European Court Reports 5285, para. 37. 
 21 Case 138/79 Roquette Frères [1980] European Court Reports 3333, para. 33. 
 22 Case 45/86 APS I [1987] European Court Reports 1493 para. 12. 
 23 Case C-170/96 [1998] European Court Reports 2763, para. 16. 
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An example: Case C-176/03 Commission vs. Council 
 
Because of the continuous marine pollution the EU decided, to create a legal 
document against this special criminal offence. The Council adopted a frame-
work decision under the third pillar. The main task of the framework decision 
was to control the so called “forum shopping effect”, and to realize a same 
level of punishment for the entire offender. It is also possible to enact legal 
documents with criminal competence for policies under the first pillar too, if 
the effective implementation of this policy is just in this way realizable.24 The 
ECJ created two key presuppositions for documents with criminal regulation 
within the first pillar. For that purpose, whilst the choice of penalties remains 
within their discretion, they must ensure in particular that infringements of 
Community law are penalized under conditions, both procedural and substantive, 
which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a 
similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive.25  
 In contrast there is not to find any regulation concerning the environmental 
protection in the title IV of the TEU. On account of this, and because of the 
possibility to create legal acts concerning in criminal matter, the ECJ repealed 
the measure.26 It is also not to forget, according to Article 47 TEU “nothing in 
this Treaty shall affect the Treaties establishing the European Communities or 
the subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing them”.  
 
The missing infringement procedure 
  
The essential difference to the juridical procedure for directives is the missing 
infringement procedure within the third pillar. There is no possibility to exert a 
direct pressure on the Member States for the sake of the complete implemen-
tation. Because of the special regulation about the legitimacy of the Court 
according to Article 35 TEU in combination with Article 46 TEU, the ECJ has 
not the right for this special procedure.  
 Nevertheless the infringement procedure is not the only way to protect 
immediately the rights of the individuals. Therefore the ECJ devised the doctrine 
of the direct effect of EC directives, because of the false implantation into the 
  
 24 Case C-2/88 Zwartweld [1990] European Court Reports 4405, para. 17. 
 25 Case 68/88 [1989] European Court Reports 2965, para. 24. 
 26 Case C-176/03 [2005] European Court Reports 7879, para. 51. 
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legal system of the Member States. However the TEU excluded obviously this 
option by the framework decisions.27  
 Furthermore the rule about the framework decisions has a lex imperfecta 
character. Because this weak control the alternative methods remained for the 
ECJ to protect the rights of the individuals. This ambitious approach was the 
EU framework decision conformity interpretation of the applicable national law.  
 
The EC Directive-conformity interpretation of the applicable national law, 
as a dogmatically prototype 
 
The EC-Directive conformity interpretation of the law made by the Member 
States as an alternative protection mechanism for the rights of the individuals 
was made by the ECJ and belongs since 1984 to its permanent jurisdiction.28 
According to Article 249 sec 3 there is freedom for the Member States to 
choose the method of the implementation of directives into the particular legal 
system. Pursuant to the Court this independence means just a freedom 
concerning the formal implementation. In the matter of that the ECJ has the 
right to supervise the implementation from the substantially point of view. In 
this context the Member States required to do any general and concrete steps 
for the effective implementation. The grade of the juridical supervision is the 
result of the implementation compared with the central task ruled by the 
framework decision. If the implementation by the Member States was not 
effective enough, the ECJ obliged the Member States to interpret directive 
conformity the applicable domestic law.29 This obligation is based on the 
loyalty of the Member States according to Article 10 ECJ.  
 The imperative for the conform interpretation is definitely provided, as a 
special protection mechanism in favor of the individuals, if the implementation 
made by the Member States is unable to realize the rights regulated by the EC 
directive. On the other hands there is a fundamental need for the possibility of 
the interpretation. In this context it has to be a general possibility of inter-
pretation within the Member State’s legal order. Otherwise there is a need for 
the possible interpretation in the special context created by the Member State’s 
law as well.30  
  
 27 Article 34 sec 2 TEU. 
 28 Case 14/83 Colson [1984] European Court Reports 1891 para. 15, Case 79/83 [1984] 
European Court Reports 1921, para 15. 
 29 Case 14/83 Colson [1984] European Court Reports 1891 para. 26. 
 30 Case 14/83 Colson [1984] European Court Reports 1891 para. 28. 
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 Furthermore the interpretation by the Member State’s Court has its own limits. 
The obligation on the national courts refer to the substance of the directive, 
when interpreting the applicable rules of its national law and is limited by 
the general principles of the community law, such as the principles of legal 
certainty and non-retroactivity of law.31 
 
The obligation on the framework decisions conformity interpretation of the 
applicable domestic law 
 
The form of the obligation on the directive conformity interpretation of the 
national law was transported to the third pillar by the ECJ.32 This figure based 
on the EC-loyalty according to Article 10 TEC. However such a regulation is 
missing from the TEU. Nevertheless the ECJ argued that with the Maastricht 
Treaty was presented a new level of integration. In this context the EU developed 
not only concerning the number of policies, but the deepness of the integration 
as well. In the matter of that, it is possible to bring the juridical mechanism made 
by the ECJ from the area of the first pillar to the equivalent fields of the third 
one. Otherwise the TEU is not “a new stage in the process of creating an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe” according Article 1 sec 2 TEU.33  
 The qualification of the framework decisions as a document of the classic 
public international law does not make any different in this context. As Advocate 
General Kokott mentioned, the Member States are obligated on the directive-
conformity interpretation too, if this is an instrument of the classic public 
international law.34 In the matter of that, the qualification of the framework 
decisions as a document of the public international law is not suitable to isolate 
absolutely the Member State’s legal order.35  
 
The constitutional limitations of the obligation on the framework decisions 
conformity interpretation of the domestic law 
 
It is important to point out that; the Court transported not only the figure of 
the obligation on the framework decisions conformity interpretation of the 
applicable national law, but the limits of this obligation as well.  
  
 31 Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmengen [1987] European Court Reports 3969 para. 13. 
 32 C-105/03 Pupino, [2005] European Court Reports 5285. 
 33 Case C-105/03 Pupino, [2005] European Court Reports 5285, para. 42. 
 34 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] European Court 
Reports, 5285 para. 37. 
 35 Adam M.: Die Wirkung von EU-Rahmenbeschlüssen im mitgliedstaatlichen Recht. 
Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (2005), 560. 
 THE LEGAL POSITION OF FRAMEWORK DECISIONS 289 
  
 Firstly, it is initially prohibited to exceed the border between the so called 
contra legem judge made law and acceptable juridical interpretation. There is 
three main form of the juridical interpretation.36 The first named prater legem 
basically suggests the legal text immanent interpretation, which is limited to 
the minor corrections or completions of the written law by judges. During the 
second art of interpretation named extra legem–intra ius the judge leaves the 
field of the written law, because it doesn’t give a proper answer in a special 
question. But the judge’s interpretation is staying within the law. The third 
category named contra legem means a legal interpretation against the written 
law, which is only allowed in a legal emergency situation.  
 In the matter of that, it is forbidden to realize so the interpretation of the 
applicable national law by the domestic court that the interpretation will be 
equivalent with the directive effect of the framework decisions. In other way 
such an interpretation a typical form of the contra legem interpretation,37 because 
according the TEU it is absolutely prohibited the direct effect of framework 
decisions.38  
 Secondly, the obligation on the framework decisions conformity interpretation 
of the domestic law is a tool created by the ECJ to protect effectively the rights 
of individuals. It is also forbidden to use this protection mechanism against the 
individuals. Because of the special character of the framework decisions, as a 
rule in the field of the criminal matters, such a constitutional restriction is very 
important. So any interpretation is forbidden in the third pillar too, which 
creates a criminal responsibility or makes the adjudication the position of the 
individuals more difficult.39  
 Thirdly, the ECJ pointed out that, the domestic courts must follow the 
fundamental rights of the EU, consisted of the constitutional tradition of the 
Member States on the one hand, and the Convention of Fundamental Rights 
signed in Rome 1950 on the other hand. The direct addressees of the EU’s 
fundamental rights are the organs of the EU.40 However the Member States are 
indirectly obliged to follow the EU’s fundamental right as far as they apply EU 
law. So during the interpretation the national judge must follow not only to the 
  
 36 Ukrow, J.: Richterliche Rechtsfortbildung durch den EuGH. Baden-Baden, 1995. 70. 
 37 Wasmeier, M.: Der Europäische Haftbefehl vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht. 
Zeitschrift für Europäische Studien (2006) 5. 
 38 Article 34 sec 2 b. 
 39 Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] European Court Reports 5285, para. 45. 
 40 Article 6 sec 2 TEU. 
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conformity with the framework decisions, but must follow at the same time the 
fundamental rights of the EU.41  
 
The protection of the individual rights: alternative methods 
 
The direct effect of the framework decisions as an alternative mechanism 
protecting the individual rights is missing under the third pillar. Furthermore 
the infringement procedure is also missing, as an indirect possibility to protect 
the rights of the individuals. So the one possibility to put pressure on the 
Member States due to the effective implementation of the framework decisions 
is the obligation on the framework decisions conformity interpretation of the 
national law created by the ECJ. However there is another protection mechanism 
according the case law, the liability of the State for loss and damage resulting 
from breach of its obligations under EU law.42 
 The liability of the State for loss and damage resulting from breach of its 
obligations under EU law was created by the ECJ because of the following 
reasons. Firstly, the direct effect of directives was ineligible due to exist of the 
legal relationship between individuals. The directives create a legal obligation 
just for the Member States, so a horizontal direct effect of directives is 
prohibited.43 Secondly, the infringement procedure was also not able to protect 
the right of the individuals, because the directive was not implemented, how-
ever the deadline for the implementation ended more years ago.  
 
It has been consistently held that the national courts, whose task is to apply the 
provisions of Community law in areas within their jurisdiction must ensure 
that those rules take full effect and must protect the rights which they confer 
on individuals.44 The obligation of Member States to make good such loss and 
damage is based on Article 10 of the EC Treaty, under which the Member States 
are required to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to 
ensure fulfillment of their obligations under Community law.45  
 So if the infringement procedure is missing, the direct effect is forbidden 
according the Treaty, it is allowed any other mechanisms to secure the protection 
  
 41 Egger A.: Die Bindung der Mitgliedstaaten an die Grundrechte in der III. Säule. 
Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht  (2005), 665. 
 42 Case 6/90 Francovich [1991] European Court Reports 5357. 
 43 Case C-188/89 Marshal [1990] European Court Reports 3313, para. 47. 
 44 Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] European Court Reports 629, para. 16, and Case C-
213/89 Factortame [1990] ECR I-2433, para. 19. 
 45 Case 6/90 Francovich [1991] European Court Reports 5357, para. 36. 
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of individual’s rights. In this context the ECJ transported on the “bridge”, set 
up between EC directives and EU framework decisions with the Pupino Case, 
the obligation of the framework decision conformity interpretation of the 
domestic law. Nevertheless it seems well possible to transport the liability of 
the State for loss and damage resulting from breach of its obligations under EU 
law as well. However the state loyalty according to Article 10 EC is missing 
under the third pillar,46 in a hypothetical case where the protection of individuals 
and the realization of the EU law’s effectiveness with other ways not possible, 
the ECJ will introduce the state responsibility in the field of the criminal 
matters as well.  
 The state liability has also additional criteria, which must be fulfilled. 
Firstly, the result prescribed by the directive should entail the grant of rights 
to individuals. Secondlym, it should be possible to identify the content of 
those rights on the basis of the provisions of the directive. Finally, the third 
condition is the existence of a causal link between the breach of the State’s 
obligation and the loss and damage suffered by the injured parties.47 
 
 
The Legal Position of the Framework Decisions 
 
After presenting the special regulation in the area of the legislation and 
juridical supervision of the framework decisions by contrast to the directives, 
as a typical legal act within the first pillar, the study will focus to the legal 
position of it. The main question in this area is to find the right position of the 
framework decisions between a legal act made by the classic international law, 
and a supranational legal act. 
 
Cyber crime Convention of the Council of Europe vs. Framework decision  
 
To point out the differences between documents that belonged to the classic 
public international law, and a framework decision, there is a need to compare 
it from the analytical point of view. In the matter of that the research tries to 
compare two documents made in the same subject, but one is a Convention under 
the classic public international law, and the other is a framework decision.  
  
 46 In the case Pupino was the missing of Article 10 EC not enough to avoid the European 
Court of Justice to introduce the obligation on the framework decisions conformity 
interpretation of the national law. 
 47 Case 6/90 Francovich [1991] European Court Reports 5357, para. 40. 
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 The Convention was purposely created sooner, so several Member States 
regarded an own ruling within the EU as unnecessary.48 However the Council 
stayed by the original idea to make an own EU ruling.49  
 There is not to find a difference in the terminology of the two documents.50 
The differences are available on the one hand in the perspectives, on the other 
hand the above mentioned nature of the international liability of the States 
caused by the documents.  
 Due to the global dimension of the cyber crimes the Council of Europe 
decided to make a comprehensive regulation, to stop the expansion of cyber crime 
without border. In this context the Convention regulated not only substance, and 
procedure law, but divers form of international cooperation as well.51 In the 
matter of that the Convention obviously presented a real wide horizontal 
perspective. However in the field of the vertical perspective the Convention is 
limited to a general level. By contrast the framework decision is concentrated 
to three essential matter of fact in the horizontal level, but in the vertical 
perspective tries to create a precise regulation.  
 To understand this difference it is important to consider the other main 
difference, the substantive nature of the liability created by the documents. The 
Convention made by the Council of Europe is legally binding for states, which 
state ratified it. In the reason of that it was possible a really wide horizontal 
perspective. Currently Cyprus, Denmark, Hungary, Estonia, France, Lithuania, 
Romania, Netherlands and Slovenia ratified the Convention, the other 18 EU 
Member-States not.52 For these 18 EU Member States the Convention is not 
legally bound. In contrast the legal binding by the framework decision started 
immediately after coming into force.  
 
Arguments of the national constitutional courts about the legal position 
 
In 2005 two national constitutional courts decided about national legal act, 
implemented the arrest warrant framework decision, and declared it incompatible 
with the constitution. However this study did not focus on the material aspects 
  
 48 Sanchez-Hermonsilla F.: Neues Strafrecht für den Kampf gegen Computerkriminalität. 
Computer und Recht (2003), 778. 
 49 Gercke M.: Der Rahmenbeschluss über Angriffe auf Informationssysteme. Computer 
und Recht (2005), 468. 
 50 Sanchez-Hermonsilla: op. cit. 778. 
 51 Gercke: op. cit. 472.  
 52 Simplified Chart of signatures and ratifications is available under (Date of download-
ing: 13/03/2007). http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp 
 THE LEGAL POSITION OF FRAMEWORK DECISIONS 293 
  
of the arrest warrant framework decision, the decisions of the national constitu-
tional courts include key aspects concerning the legal position of the framework 
decisions.  
 The German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) surprisingly pointed out 
that, the legal characteristic of the third pillar is a simply intergovernmental 
cooperation,53 and the area belongs despite of the development to the public 
international law.54 Firstly, the decision procedure based according to the BVerfG 
on consensus, as representing a typical character for decision making within 
the intergovernmental cooperation. Secondly, the active participation of the 
European Parliament within the legislation procedure is limited to the consul-
tation. However these two involved characteristics are available in the decision 
making within the supranational first pillar as well.55 Meanwhile last the 
persuasive argument supported by the BVerfG is applicable, which pointed out 
the missing juridical supervision the implementation actions of the framework 
decisions made by the Member States. Nevertheless this single argument makes 
the arrangement of framework decisions to act of the classic international law 
not clear.56 The Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s decision has the same opinion 
concerning the legal position of the framework decisions. According to the 
Tribunal this measure has the nature of a regular international agreement, as a 
result of cooperation between the Member States.57 
 However the conclusion of these two decisions made by national consti-
tutional courts was the same, the reaction of the national legal orders was 
absolutely different. In Germany the legislator designed a new national legal 
act to implement the arrest warrant framework decision considering the criteria 
of the compatibility with the German Constitution pointed out by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court. However this criterion does not strictly fulfill the 
anti-discriminating regulation of the EU.58 By contrast the President of the 
Republic of Poland introduced a bill to the Marshal of the Sejm proposing to 
change the constitution.59 As a result of this change of the Polish Constitution 
now it fulfills now the criteria of the compatibility with the arrest warrant 
framework decision. With other words expressed, Germany purposely made a 
  
 53 Bundesverfassungsgerichts Decision 18. 07. 2005. para. 73. 
 54 Ibid. para. 81. 
 55 For example: Articles 61, 93, 175 sec 2, 308 TEC. 
 56 Wasmeier: op. cit. 28. 
 57 Leczykiewicz, D.: Note to the Trybunal Konstytucyjny (Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal), Judgment of 27 April 2005, Common Market Law Review (2006) 1183. 
 58 Reinhardt J./Düsterhaus D.: Verfassungsgemäß, aber gemeinschaftswidrig. Neue 
Zeitschrift für Vervaltungsrecht (2006) 432. 
 59 Leczykiewicz: op. cit. 1191. 
294 ÁKOS DOMAHIDI 
  
new regulation which is now compatible with the German Constitution, and 
not consistent with the EU law, nevertheless Poland has changed the own 





The framework decisions, as the central legal act under the “third pillar” are 
some of the most significant non-typical documents from a dogmatic point of 
view, within the EU law. The obvious contrasts and specialties of this legislative 
act, correlated with the EC Treaty are available not only in the lawmaking 
process, but in juridical supervision as well.  
 The legislation procedure is different from conventional form of the law-
making under the supranational law. However there are examples within the 
first pillar, where the main decisions form is to acting unanimously and the 
participation of the European Parliament is limited to the consultation.60 
Framework decisions are not document of classic public international law 
(according to the position of the German Federal Constitutional Court), and 
they consequently do belong to a supranational system.  
 The main argument, beside the qualification of these legal acts in the 
Constitutional Treaty, the existing legal “bridge” set up between EC directives 
and EU framework decisions made by the ECJ. On this connection was so far 
transported the obligation of the framework decision conform interpretation 
of the national law. However the establishment of state liability by the ECJ 
within the criminal matters is not to be prohibited. This method is not only a 
possibility to protect the rights of the individuals, but also a method to exert a 




 60 For example: Articles 61, 93, 175 sec 2, 308 EC.  
